On The Foundations of National Military
Strategy: Past and Present

A Monograph
by

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Infantry

MENS EST CLAVIS VICTORIAE

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 90-91

91-17560

91 1210 094

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: PAST AND PRESENT

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
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8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

SEE ATTACHED PAGE

14. SUBJECT TERMS
CONTAINMENT
BALANCE OF POWER
DETERRENCE
SOVIET THREAT
PARADIGM
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
65

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNLIMITED

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

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Title of Monograph   On the Foundations of National Military Strategy: Past and Present

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Accepted this 31st day of December 1990

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The attached monograph, "On the Foundations of National Military Strategy: Past and Present," identifies the Hobbsian nation-state system, the Soviet threat, Containment, Deterrence, the Bi-polar balance of power, European focus, and a cumbersome bureaucracy as the foundations of America's national military strategy during the Cold War period. The author labelled these items "the Current Paradigm." Research was then conducted to determine the legitimacy of the current paradigm. The result of this research led the author to conclude that current domestic and international trends and realities called each element of the current paradigm into question. This finding, the author goes on to claim, implies (a) that to use the current paradigm in the present domestic and international situation would not result in appropriate solutions to current problems; therefore (b) a new paradigm was required. The monograph closes with the suggestion of a new paradigm, the components of which are the following: a Humean international system, Diminished external threats and increased internal threats, Inclusion, Justified intervention, Balancing powers and the power of balance, Global focus, and a Faster, more creative bureaucracy. The author acknowledges the difficulties in abandoning a set of beliefs that have successfully governed national military strategy for fifty years and adopting a new set, but he quickly points out the risks in not doing so.

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Introduction

The end of study should be to direct the mind towards the enunciation of sound and correct judgments on all matters that come before it.

Rene Descartes
Rules for the Direction of the Mind

Why does a national military strategy change? How does it change? Two studies-- *The Seeds of Disaster*, by Robert Doughty and *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, by Barry Posen-- describe changes that the French armed forces made during the period between the world wars. These changes were incremental, organizational modifications that proved insufficient given the realities facing the French and the technology available. The French had not really changed, in anything other than a cosmetic sense, prior to WW II.[1]

I shall argue that fundamental changes in national military strategy involve first a conceptual change which then results in practical changes. To change a strategy requires fundamental shifts in the way the military profession views the world. Further, I shall explain these conceptual changes and shifts in world view as paradigm shifts. That is, the way a nation raises, equips, deploys, organizes, educates, trains, fights, coordinates, and sustains its armed forces is that nation's military strategy[2], and this strategy derives from the operant paradigm held by that nation's armed forces.

These are bold claims, ones for which I shall adduce arguments and evidence later. For now, consider this: Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Einstein--each is a name familiar for what he represents as well as what he did. Each represents a scientific change of monumental proportions: the sun-centered astronomical system, the modern scientific method, the theory of gravity and the mechanistic universe, and the theory of relativity. The fundamental changes that these men suggested, later proven by others, changed the rules for conducting science and mapped out new directions for the study of the physical world. The men listed above identified

"new" realities, saw patterns among these new phenomena, and suggested cohesive ways to put these patterns together. Thus, they changed the history of science. Such fundamental change is normal in the progression of science, and, I think offers insight into the nature of change and how it applies to armed forces.

Thomas S. Kuhn, in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, explains these fundamental changes of science in terms of shifts of paradigms. Paradigms are important, according to Kuhn, because they constitute the shared beliefs of the scientific community which govern the conduct of "normal" science and provide the foundation of a professional culture.[3] Scientific change, or progress, comes in the form of new observations and "facts" that challenge the current paradigm. At this point the scientific community has two options: either continue to hold to the old paradigm, calling the new observations anamolies or exceptions, or adopt a new paradigm. History shows that scientists usually choose the former option. They remain conservative, holding on to their old ways of understanding, interpreting, and problem solving. They make modifications and incremental adjustments to what they "know to be true" (like the French did during the inter-war years). Generally, scientists continue trying to solve the problems that arise from the new observations and "facts" in ways that they had been taught. They fall back upon ways that "worked before," only to find solutions are wanting incomplete and insufficient. Finally, the growing numbers of anamolies and exceptions creates a crisis; the old paradigm collapses. A new paradigm steps forward, and a scientific revolution occurs. first in thought, then in practice. The revolution is complete when members of the scientific profession test and verify the new paradigm, then show how it incorporates the former anamolies and exceptions.[4]

Kuhn's model for scientific change has tremendous explanatory power in its ability to analyze change within professional communities. With it, one may gain new insights into

fundamental changes in military history. However, I intend a more contemporary use. I shall argue that the United States is in the process of a paradigm shift concerning its national military strategy. The argument will follow four steps: first, an explanation of the nature of a paradigm, how it works, how and why it shifts; second, a description of the U.S. military's current paradigm; third, a listing of trends and realities that challenge the current paradigm's legitimacy; and last, some suggestions concerning a new paradigm and its implications.

Step 1: Paradigms: An example of what they are, how they work, how and why they shift.

The ideal is realized through its own use....Knowing...means a certain kind of intelligently conducted doing; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a true sense practical.

John Dewey
Reconstruction in Philosophy

Unfortunately, Kuhn did not present one clearly articulated definition of a paradigm. In fact he uses the term in 21 ways.[5] However, despair need not result. From this variety, one can draw the following set of conditions which circumscribe the nature and uses of a paradigm.

The term "paradigm" applies if it:

1. describes the received beliefs of a specific body of knowledge.[6]
2. is agreed upon, shared by, and governs the beliefs of a professional community.[7]
3. has a set of institutions or a bureaucracy through which the paradigm is used, promulgated, taught, and further articulated.[8]
4. establishes the professional understanding by:
    a. defining "problems" and "puzzles" to be solved--i.e. establishes the scope of legitimate research;[9]
    b. working as a tool to solve "problems" or "puzzles;"[10]
    c. establishing the methods of research,[11]
    d. establishing the criteria of success;[12]
    e. interpreting, organizing, and explaining data and phenomena;[13]

These conditions delineate a school of thought which has its own truths and prophets, beliefs and believers, teachings and teachers. The school's professional community uses its

truths, beliefs, and teachings to explain and interpret the world, predict the future, identify problems and prescribe methods for solving them, conduct research, and educate new members.[14]

The French military, in the period between the world wars, provides a good example The profession had a dominant school of thought concerning the future direction of its military strategy. This school was guided by a set of beliefs, its paradigm, used to develop their country's military stategy. It sought to identify and define the pertinent military problems that they had to solve, study the problems, and present solutions in accord with the school's paradigm and workable on the future battlefield, as defined by the school's members

The main beliefs which governed France's military paradigm include the following: (1) alliance diplomacy and the perceived need of cementing a tie with England as fundamental to victory in a coming war;[15] (2) belief that the key to victory in battle lies in the centralized control of fires by division and higher commanders and infantry as the decisive combat arm;[16] (3) predicting that future war lies in the methodical battle[17] not infiltration maneuver. breakthrough, and swift attack in depth;[18] and (4) translation of the methodical battle into an attrition-oriented, static defense that they hoped would buy time needed to orchestrate their alliance and mobilize resources[19] or an equally stylized, attrition-oriented method of attack used even by their mechanized forces.[20] While the paradigm certainly contained other elements, these four will suffice for purposes of example.

The beliefs of the paradigm are important, for accepting a paradigm is like accepting a judicial decision.[21] Acceptance entails use; paradigms are practical constructs, not merely theoretical. The French would see the practical result of their paradigm in 1939-40.[22] Results are important. However, this essay aims to illuminate the use of a paradigm as well as

what results from it.

Accepting their paradigm entailed key decisions for French military strategy. They raised, equipped, deployed, organized, educated, trained, fought, coordinated, and sustained their military forces in concert with the paradigm they adopted.

The French raised an army whose term of service was reduced to eighteen months in 1924 and to twelve months in 1928, whose proficiency was suited primarily for defense, and whose term of service was a major impetus for the construction of the Maginot Line.[23] The army was equipped for static, defensive warfare and methodical battle. In the defense, tanks supported infantry. In the offense, tanks attacked in a linear, methodical way with the pace of the attack tied to the range of supporting artillery.[24] As Doughty explains, "objectives were placed about fifteen hundred meters apart, the infantry and artillery could provide protective fires, and the tanks' movement could be more closely controlled."[25] The army deployed to defend French frontiers in linear, near cordon fashion with some, albeit arguably insufficient and ill controlled, reserves.[26] They occupied the "centerpiece of interwar French military" thinking the Maginot Line.[27] The Maginot Line, in addition to protecting soldiers, defending a traditional invasion route, and providing economy of force, protected French industry which had to mobilize to support of the kind of war the French military envisioned.[28]

Organizationally, France did have a modern force for its day. French cavalry did change into a light mechanized division; unfortunately, overall "movement toward mechanization was...characterized by...fragmentation and diversity."[29] Almost half the French tanks were employed in an infantry support role.[30] The French employed less than 25 percent in armored divisions."[31] Most of the French army was organized primarily to fight defensively, then to transition to a slow, ponderous, methodical, firepower-based counterattack.[32] French doctrine

called for centralized control and following rigid plans.[33] The "methodical battle would not be overturned [even] by the tank; rather, the tank had become an integral part of that step-by-step, carefully controlled battle....employed ahead of the infantry...in order to destroy the stronger defenses....After they overran an enemy position, the following infantry and their tanks would...move forward....The French wanted the tank to be bound tightly to the infantry and to be restrained by the tether of artillery support."[34] They knew the Germans had mastered encounter battles, "battles [that] take place unexpectedly, between forces on the move," but the French military avoided them.[35] Why? Doughty suggests that the French realized that their one-year soldiers could not fight such battles.[36]

French military strategy developed as a result of the attempt to solve the problems confronting the country--the German threat, lessons learned from their WW I experience, their study and testing of new technologies, and domestic restraints and demands. The problems were framed by and solutions derived from the paradigm governing French military thinking. With this paradigm, the French identified which problems they had to solve, defined these problems, established the methods for their research, and identified successful solutions Wrong though they were, the French solutions were consistent with the paradigm they held.

Had the French been able to identify that their paradigm was incorrect, as some members of the profession claimed, they may have arrived at different conclusions. However, shifts in paradigms are difficult. On one hand, new paradigms offer new explanations of reality, new possibilities in solving problems, new ways to adapt, and new chances for success in a changing world. On the other hand, professions often fiercely resist paradigm shifts because such shifts entail changes to the prevailing system and elimination of settled bureaucracies, policies, procedures, and interests. However, paradigms do shift.

They shift because the old paradigm no longer "fits" current realities. The operant

paradigm does not work as well as it did. It identifies successful solutions with decreased regularity. Paradigms shift because someone, or some group, finds a new paradigm and shows that it can do what the former could not. As Kuhn puts it: "a novel theory emerged only after a pronounced failure in the normal problem-solving activity."[37] How do they shift? Not cleanly.

The process leading to paradigm shift begins almost imperceptibly. At first, "facts" are discovered that the operant paradigm did not expect and cannot explain--anomalies. Adherents to the paradigm "will devise numerous articulations and *ad hoc* modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict."[38] Over time, however, anomalies create a crisis for the operant paradigm and its believers. The growing number of modifications required of the paradigm to accommodate an increasing number of anomalies results in the following realization: that what some had called anomalies are really counter-instances which demonstrate that the operant paradigm is insufficient.[39] At this point the profession is in crisis. As Einstein observed, it is as if "the ground [is] pulled out from under one, with no firm foundation to be seen anywhere."[40]

"The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one," Kuhn writes, "is a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals...that changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its...methods and applications."[41] During transition, debate abounds. Writers present alternative theories in professional journals and papers.[42] The debate ends not with logic alone. Rather, the adoption of a new paradigm has as much to do with psychology and sociology as with logic and evidence.[43]

A paradigm shift results in new methods for problem identification, statement, and solution. The impact upon the profession is immense. What is accepted is not just a new theory, but all that derives from it. With respect to military strategy, a new paradigm will

result in new approaches to raising, equipping, deploying, organizing, educating, training, fighting, coordinating, and sustaining an armed force. Mere logic and evidence are insufficient to motivate such shifts. Paradigm shifts are akin to an intellectual conversion or transfer of allegiance.[44] One can understand the resistance to paradigm shifts.

The real issue of a paradigm debate is control over the future of a profession--not just theoretical control resulting from defining the new paradigm, but real control of agenda, bureaucracy, and budget.[45] Thus, Kuhn suggests that advocates of new paradigms are often "men so young or so new to the crisis-ridden field that practice has committed them less deeply than most of their contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm."[46]

Doughty's and Posen's description of the inter-war French military corroborates much of Kuhn's explanation of paradigm shifts and the institutional resistance to such shifts. The organizational behavior of the French military profession--with confusing authority, vague powers, cumbersome administrative procedures--precluded them from innovation and from developing a more appropriate response to the realities they faced. The bureaucratic environment in the French High Command, Posen shows, "favored the development of a doctrine relying on the strength of the defense, methodical battle, and firepower."[47] Thus, Doughty explains, France " had prepared for and gone to war with a cumbersome military hierarchy [and supporting bureaucracy] ill-suited to innovative and flexible responses in peace or war."[48]

During the inter-war period, the French commissioned several studies and tests concerning future war and the role of the tank and mechanized forces in it. Some recommended revolutionary changes, but no such changes occurred.[49] Why? Correctly, one might adduce several answers to this question, but key to each must be the requirement that the tank or any

other innovation "fit into" the French military's belief in centralized control and the attrition-oriented "methodical battle."[50] Any more audacious use would require a shift in paradigm.

France was unable to adopt a new paradigm despite a public debate over the future of the French army and an increasing military budget. "Numerous articles appeared in military journals about the role of the tank."[51] In response, another commission studied the question only to result in establishing "the standard French approach to the tank that was to endure through 1939."[52] While the French made some minor modifications to their doctrine, no radical change occurred.[53] Nor, from an understanding of paradigms, could one realistically expect a radical change to occur. Posen identifies the practical impossibility to change, for "new technologies were in the custody of very traditional services....The military hierarchy was inflexible...[with] little civilian pressure to innovate."[54] During the five years leading up to 1939, France had increased its military budget from 11.48 billion francs to 93.39 billion, an eight-fold increase.[55] Yet, the money was not spent on a war-winning military.[56] The budget was spent in accordance with the paradigm governing the French military profession.

The French manifested, again as Kuhn explains is the case in most professions, an inability to change. Misuse of military history, bureaucratic organization, inertia, vested interests of "ruling" groups, "constituencies" among various branches and commissions--all mitigated against fundamental change. While the French sought to avoid misusing history by basing their doctrine solely on principles derived from historical studies,[57] the system the French had for the study of history resulted in a narrow focus on their own experiences and interpretations of them, vice a more objective and comprehensive study.[58] Doughty explains that despite recent French colonial experiences and the experiences of other nations in wars more recent than World War I, the "battle of Montdidier became the common basis for officers to study and learn...a model of the methodical battle, of centralized control, and of effective

planning and execution" for the French military.[59] The French concluded that "methodical techniques could be applied outside Europe....[and] that methods had to be adapted to the circumstances."[60] "No new method or counter evidence," Doughty states, "could overturn or replace [the concept of total war and methodical battle]."[61]

Organizationally, the "French did not have a smoothly functioning system in which specific individuals had precise responsibilities for analyzing issues and resolving problems."[62] The "chief of the general staff of national defense...only had powers of coordination, not of command."[63] Such an organization did not, nor could it, provide the army with a firm sense of direction.[64] Inertia in the French military was with infantry and artillery, not armored forces. Those who controlled the French military profession, as Doughty explains, labelled tank enthusiast "extremists."[65] They allowed that the tank would play a role on the future battlefield, but "its employment was carefully enclosed within and constrained by the doctrine of the methodical battle."[66] Again, study after study confirmed this conclusion.[67] The controlling constituencies within the French military were not disposed to relinquish control--not for any sinister reason, but for reasons completely explicable.

Doughty explains, "more than being a victim of German military excellence, France was a victim of her own historical experience...and political and military institutions...[her] choices [were] constrained and partially shaped by these influencing factors."[68] "The failure to change sufficiently," he goes on to say,

> is rooted in the political, institutional, historical, and strategic relationships
> that induced the French to mold and adapt the new weaponry to the prevailing
> doctrine. The army viewed technological developments from the perspective of
> already accepted concepts and did not perceive new ideas or weapons overturning
> or forcing a fundamental transformation...of accepted doctrine. The...High
> Command...found it easier to compromise than to construct something fundamentally
> new....most new concepts and weapons...were grafted onto older methods or
> assimilated into existing organizations. ..Only some fundamental changes in

thinking could have altered the main outline of the 1940 solution.[69]

French commissions--who were to study the future of war in light of new technologies, organizations, and doctrine--merely confirmed the profession's paradigm. On the whole, the profession treated novel alternatives as anomolies not counter-instances. Professions and their bureaucracies do not shift paradigms easily. Not until Germany demonstrated that France's paradigm was outdated did the French military, as a profession, realize its crisis.[70] "By 1936, the thought patterns and organizational structure were set. When Hitler began his depredations, few were willing to embark upon risky innovations."[71] Germany was about to present France with the ultimate counter-instance. Paradigms, France would realize, are practical constructs, not merely theoretical. "The rapid collapse of Poland," Doughty observes, "provided a sense of urgency."[72] The paradigm-military strategy link is real.

Like the French, and all other nations, the United States' national military strategy derives from its paradigm. America raises, equips, deploys, organizes, educates, trains, fights, coordinates, and sustains her armed forces in concert with a specific set of beliefs and imperatives. These beliefs and imperatives operate just as the ones governing the French had. The paradigm describes the accepted beliefs of the military community; has a bureacracy through which the paradigm is used, taught, and articulated; and is used to identify, define, and solve the problems which face the profession. In the section that follows, I shall present a description of the American paradigm.

Step 2: The paradigm currently governing the U.S. military.

Faith in a fact can help create the fact.

William James
The Will to Believe

In 1651, Thomas Hobbes published his classic, *Leviathan.* In it he presented what remains the theoretical foundation of international relations. "Nature," Hobbes wrote, "has

made men so equal" that, while one may be "stronger in body or of quicker mind than another ... the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest," either by surprise or by joining with others.[73] Because each person has an equal ability to get what he wants and, therefore, an equal hope of attaining his ends, the Hobbesian state of nature is unstable in the extreme. It is, according to Hobbes, a state of constant war with "every man against every man," a war which consists not only of battle, but also of the psychological instability that results from knowing someone or some group might attack at any moment.[74]

Although Hobbes did not describe the nature of the international community, others have applied his ideas to create such a description. Each state in the international community, according to the Hobbesian model, stands against the other just as each person stands against the other in the Hobbesian state of nature. In *Political Theory and International Relations*, Charles R. Beitz explains that "the application of Hobbes's conception of the state of nature to international relations serves two different functions. First, it provides an analytical model that explains war as the result of structural properties of international relations....Second, [it] provides a model...that explains how normative principles for international relations should be justified."[75] Beitz goes on to demonstrate the paucity of the Hobbesian model; however, his detailed and precise treatment testifies to the model's power and continued appeal.[76]

John Spanier's international politics textbook, *Games Nations Play* exemplifies the appeal and utility of the Hobbesian model. One can easily see the Hobbesian influence in his text, the seventh edition of which was published just recently. He describes the interantional community as a system in which:

> each state...is the guardian of its own security....Each regards other states as potential enemies that may threaten fundamental interests. Consequently, states generally feel insecure and regard one another with a good deal of apprehension and distrust All become very concerned about their strengths, or power. In order to prevent an attack, a state must be as powerful as potential aggressors.[77]

As Spanier demonstrates, the power a nation possesses itself, or in concert with allies, is fundamental to the Hobbesian model.

Power, and its use to guarantee the security of one's nation, is one of the most dominant themes in any study of international relations and national security. In the absence of a common power to keep each member of the international community in check, each nation must either be strong enough to protect its survival against likely aggressors or be in alliance with those who can. Thus, Spanier again applies Hobbes' ideas to describe international politics as "the product of a state system that is characterized by the absence of a legitimate central government...[and a] set of rules or norms that govern (sic) the way in which political conflicts can be resolved peacefully."[78]

Some might argue that Spanier is extreme in his characterization.[79] However, influential policy makers and strategic planners have and still do use the Hobbesian model.[80] For example, the model underlies the Secretary of Defense's current annual report to the President and the Congress and the President's latest national security strategy[81]

The Hobbesian model, one seems warranted to conclude, is the theoretical foundation of the paradigm governing America's military strategy and sets the international stage onto which post-World War II America walked. Furthermore, that the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as the two superpowers in a Hobbesian nation-state system, provides the motivation for and justification of the next two elements of the paradigm· the analysis of the threat and the development of a national strategy to meet that threat.

Western leaders understood even before the end of World War II that the main post-war threat in the international arena would be the Soviet Union. In the United States, while post-war policy makers debated over the correct policy to meet this threat, no one denied that the major threat was the Soviet Union.[82] The National Security Council viewed the U.S.-Soviet

relationship as "a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin."[83] What becomes apparent from this view of the Soviet threat is its ideological component. Communist ideology threatened democratic ideals, and this threat gave the Cold War its particular intensity.[84]

In addition, the Communists were aggressive and posed significant military strength. The Soviet Union was viewed then, and one could argue plausibly is viewed by some still, as seeking "to create overwhelming military force, in order to back up infiltration with intimidation" to dominate the world.[85] NSC 68, a strategic assessment produced by the National Security Council in 1950, identified the Soviet Union as "animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own [which] seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world."[86] This portrayal continued well into the mid-1970s when "a group of prominent citizens banded together...to arouse the public and sound the alarm [declaring] that the Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world dominated from a single center—Moscow."[87] When this aggressive, ideological, militarily well-equipped threat developed a nuclear capability, it took on another, much more ominous aspect—it became a physical threat to the existence of the United States.

The Soviet Threat has been—and remains, at least in some sectors and with some prominent professionals—the primary focus of American national military strategy. James Schlesinger recognized this focus in his annual Defense Department Report of FY 1975. There, he identified the Soviet Union as the dominant threat against which both our nuclear and conventional forces are aimed.[88] This belief also governed Secretary Casper Weinberger's analysis presented in his annual report of FY 1985.[89] Even in the most recent Defense Department annual report Secretary Dick Cheney says, "Although the changes begun in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are welcome, Soviet armed forces remain the most serious

military threat to the United States and its allies."[90] As recently as October 1990, Lt. Gen

Charles B. Eichelberger's "The Hazards of an Unstable World" re-emphasized the physical

component of the Soviet threat. He wrote,

> Despite undertaking internal reforms, reductions and arms control
> negotiations, the Soviet Union will remain the largest standing European
> land army. Although Moscow is restructuring its armed forces on the
> principle of sufficiency, these forces will be equipped with more capable,
> modernized weapons. In addition, the Soviets are continuing to modernize
> their offensive strategic nuclear systems. These systems make the USSR
> the only state capable of destroying the United States. While their use
> is not expected, we cannot lose sight of this capability.[91]

On the strategic level, one cannot doubt that the Soviet Union, understood as an aggressive,

ideological as well as physical threat to the United States, remained the focal point of post-war

U.S. strategic analysis.

This strategic analysis, when coupled with the corresponding emphasis each service has

given to training and educating its forces to defeat Soviet and Soviet-client armed forces, leads

one to see that the paradigm governing U.S. national military strategy contains an

overwhelming belief in the Soviet Threat. Moreover, this threat analysis is the object of the

policy of containment and the strategy of deterrence.

Containment's origin is often attributed to George Kennan's "X" article of 1947[92] in

which he said, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be

that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive

tendencies."[93] When one understands the Soviet threat as both ideological and physical, one

sees that containment expanded the definition of "vital national interest" beyond security,

narrowly conceived, to include ideological interests.[94] America had to stop the ideology from

spreading, even where such expansion did not pose a physical threat to her interests. Adopting

this policy meant that the U.S. sought to contain Kremlin-directed communist expansion--

wherever it occurred.[95]

"Acceptance of the policy of containment," write Jordan and Taylor in *American National Security*, "laid the foundation for...American strategic policy....Opposition to communist expansion became the fundamental principle of American foreign policy."[96] Containment provided the impetus for NATO and for the "pactomania" of the Eisenhower-Dulles years.[97] Containing Soviet directed and inspired communist expansion provided the rationale for our actions during the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, and our opposition to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In his recent "National Security Strategy of the United States," President Bush recognizes the important role that containment played in American foreign policy and national military strategy,

> The challenge of an aggressive, repressive Soviet Union was contained by
> a system of alliances, which we helped create, and led....perhaps it was
> inevitable that the Soviet Union, met by a strong coalition of free nations
> determined to resist its encroachments, would have to turn inward to face
> the internal contradictions of its own deeply flawed system--as our policy
> of containment always envisioned.[98]

From containment flowed the strategy of deterrence. In fact the two are linked essentially: the United States hoped to contain the Soviet Union by deterring her from expansive moves. American forces would confront the Russians "with unalterable counter-force at every point where [the Soviets] show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."[99] Deterrence, the dominant strategy executing the policy of containment,[100] sought to keep an opponent from a given course by posing unacceptable risks.[101]

The administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush would apply diplomatic action or military force to deter the Soviets from their hegmonic design. Alliances or other aggreements would also deter the Soviets. Concerning the military

arm of deterrence and containment, forces would be nuclear and conventional. Forward deployed troops of any service; early deployment of military forces whether sea, land, or air; the possession of a first and second strike nuclear arsenal; and the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative--all would provide deterrence.

Deterrence has driven, and continues to drive, our national military strategy. It provides one of the foundations of both "The Maritime Strategy" of Admiral Watkins and "The Amphibious Warfare Strategy" of General Kelly."[102] It provides partial rationale for our nuclear triad. President Bush lists deterrence as the first component of America's grand strategy, and Secretary Cheney labels deterrence as "the highest priority of the Department of Defense."[103] Belief in deterrence, like containment from which it flows, forms another key belief of the American paradigm.

The next component of the paradigm currently governing American military thinking concerns the world in which the threat was identified, containment professed, and deterrence executed, the bi-polar world. "World War II destroyed the multipolar balance of power," says Joseph Nye in *Bound to Lead*. "and ushered in the age of Soviet-American bi-polarity"[104] Secretary Schlesinger reflects the opinion of others before and after him when, in his annual report of 1975, he reminded us that "the United States bears the principal burden of maintaining the worldwide military equilibrium which is the foundation for the security and the survival of the Free World....In fulfilling this responsibility we recognize that we are dealing with a world which is militarily dominated by two states--ours and the Soviet Union."[105] Bi-polarity, therefore, is also key to the paradigm governing the American military profession.

This bi-polarity led to the American focus on Europe. The worst-case scenario, and the one most feared even during the Korean War, was the possibility of a Soviet attack of Western

Europe.[106] Peter Drucker summarizes this focus in *The New Realities*:

> When the Cold War began in the 1940s, it was the recovery of Europe and the
> NATO military alliance on which the United States based its foreign policy....
> America's policies and actions [even in] Asia--whether the Korean War,
> the Vietnam War, or President Nixon's rapprochement with Communist
> China--were essentially parts of America's European strategy to contain
> and counterbalance a *European*-centered Russia.(empahsis in original)[107]

While battle in Europe may have been the least likely, it was the highest threat, for it was the battle with the highest probability of escalating to nuclear exchange. U.S. armed forces prepared for this scenario most earnestly. The bulk of each service's budget went to developing, procuring, and fielding weapons systems, conventional and nuclear, that would ensure success in the "high intensity," central battle of Europe. Service schools and training exercises paid primary attention to the European battlefield. In planning, preparing, and practicing operations to gain control of the air, control of the sea, or control of the ground, Europe was the main concern. Planners attented to insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and other contingency missions; however, these were "low intensity" conflict. While acknowledged as more likely, they were of secondary importance. They were the "half wars" America had to be ready to fight. The big war was in Europe.

However, as important as the international system, the Soviet threat, containment, deterrence, Europe, and the bi-polar world are in determining our national military strategy, these elements do not comprise the entire paradigm which governs that strategy. Like the French and most other organizations, the Department of Defense and the Service Departments are hierarchical bureaucracies. As such, they behave within predictable parameters. Important decisions are made at the top and executed at the bottom of the organization. They are conservative, cumbersome, slow to make decisions, and relatively inflexible--especially where significant change or rapid reorientation is required. As in all bureaucracies, internal, organizational, "turf" considerations--vested interests and constituencies--figure as

prominantly as do considerations of effectivenss and efficiency.[108] "The iron law of bureaucracies," writes Hedrick Smith in *The Power Game*, "is to grow and to control their own fiefdoms, and the military services--being bureacracies--follow that law."[109]

Couple these characteristics with fiscal constraints, competition for limited rescurces, Congressional demands and restrictions, service agendas, personalities, and media scrutiny. The result paints the true picture of the context within which our military strategy is developed, planned, and executed.[110] Some have gone so far as to adduce evidence they think sufficient enough to conclude that organizational factors, not the others, are the most important ones in determining what our national military strategy looks like.[111] In a 1986 essay published in Parameters, Jeffrey S. McKitrick goes so far as to say that even after the latest JCS Reorganization Act, "vestiges of the World War II service-oriented military establishment continue to exist."[112] McKitrick then concludes by saying, "it is doubtful that any major reform will take place, absent a military disaster that generates public demand for change."[113] A more recent Parameters' essay by Colonel A.J. Bacevich goes so far as to argue that the American military profession is locked in a nostalgic embrace with World War II, an embrace that precludes a detached, objective analysis of modern war and guarantees a self-indulgent devotion to a "Pattonesque style of warfare."[114]

As unpleasant as recognition of these kinds of factors is, an accurate description of the current paradigm requires it. The fact that one tries to eliminate these kinds of influencers as counterproductive, does not diminish their continued relevance in the development of national military strategy. More to the point: these are just the kinds of influences Kuhn has in mind that demonstrate why professions and their bureaucracies find it so hard to shift paradigms, despite the fact that realities show they should. To present the paradigm under which national strategy is developed without acknowledging these organizational characteristics would be to

present an incomplete analysis.

One might claim, correctly, that the paradigm governing the development of our military strategy consists of other beliefs or imperatives. I can only agree. However, the seven part paradigm outlined above--belief in the Hobbesian nation-state system, the Soviet threat, containment, deterrence, bi-polar balance of power, European focus, and hierarchical bureaucracy--seems to be sufficient for purposes of these minimal claims: (1) whatever strategy the Secretary of Defense and the JCS have developed since World War II, it has been consistent with the foregoing seven beliefs; (2) however the Department of Defense, the JCS, or the services have identified then solved problems, the solutions have been consistent with these seven beliefs; and (3) that the foregoing paradigm describes the set of beliefs shared by, promulgated, taught, and used by the members of America's military profession.

The Armed Forces of the United States--air, sea, and land--are raised, equipped, deployed, organized, educated, trained, fought, coordinated, and sustained in a way that is consistent with the seven part paradigm outlined above. From the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine to the MX missile, from massive retaliation to competing strategies, from the Berlin Crisis to the Cuban missile crisis, from the Korean War to Vietnam, from Contra assistance to support for Afghan resistance--these beliefs have functioned just as Kuhn describes a paradigm functions. This paradigm has helped the United States military profession explain and interpret the world, predict the future, identify problems and prescribe solutions, conduct research, and educate new members of the profession. In sum, from these beliefs and imperatives we have derived our national military strategy. These beliefs and imperatives circumscribe the paradigm currently governing the American military profession.

However, just as the elements of the current paradigm--and, by extension, the national military strategy which derives from it--were not immutable when first presented, one should not consider them immutable now. World War II ended with significant changes to the

international community; America adapted to those changes. I shall argue in the next section that the end of the Cold War has resulted in equally significant changes. In fact, current trends and realities seem to challenge the foundation of each element of the current paradigm.

Step 3: Trends and realities that suggest we are at a point of paradigm shift.

Everything is moving and nothing stays still.

Heraclitus
Fragments

The Hobbesian model and the international order which flows from it is losing its exp.anatory power. It is less descriptive of the nature of sovereign states and of the way these states interact with one another. States themselves are less autonomous than they once were, the distinction between domestic and foreign policie.; are becoming blurred. Behavior of states in the international community is limited, albeit incompletely, by world opinion, international conventions, transnational commerce, and international organizations. While the changes are not universal, they are growing in scope and strength. In sum, they mark a significant change to the way international affairs are conducted.

The traditional Hobbesian model presupposes that each member of the international community is a sovereign state, a state that monopolizes control over its finances, economy, geography, and coercive power. These sovereign nations are the common power that ends Hobbes' state of war of every man against every other and sets the rules of domestic behavior. International behavior, to the contrary, has no such common power; therefore, states act in their self-interest more or less unconstrained. However, as Joseph S. Nye points out in *Bound to Lead*, the distinction between domestic and international is not as absolute as it once was.[115] *National sovereignty* is being redefined in light of the growing transnational economic system; the world money market; global capital; and the age of instant, tele-communications and computer technology. Growing interdependence, world opinion as projected by a global media

system, and the increasing significance of international institutions and conventions are transforming the international community.

"Economic theory," says Peter Drucker in *The New Realities*, "still assumes that the sovereign national state is the sole, or at least predominant unit, and the only one capable of effective economic policy."[116] However, such is no longer the case. Drucker demonstrates that a growing number of businesses are becoming transnational companies who do their designing "anyplace within the system....do their research wherever there are research scientists....produce wherever the economics of manufacturing dictate....business plans, business strategies, and business decisions....operate without regard for national boundaries."[117] The transnational character of the global economy is reflected across the corporate spectrum--communications, brokers, bankers, manufacturers, service industries, clothiers, musicians, film makers, entertainers, publishers, and television. The world economy is growing separately from national economies.[118]

Transnational actors will continue, and at a more rapid pace, to erode what had been the sovereign power of the nation-state. "Companies are forming into what might be called 'information-sharing groups,' according to Alvin Toffler's *Powershift*.[119] The future economy will be a network of companies forming "alliances, partnerships, agreements, research and technical [cooperatives]."[120] And, as the number of transnational companies grows arithmetically, the numbers of possible combinations grows geometrically. The result? "Mega-firms [that are] essentially non-national....capable of transferring operations, funds, pollution, and people across borders....As [these multinationals] lose their strictly national boundaries, the entire relationship between global firms and national governments is transformed."[121]

With the rise in transnational corporations comes a world money market and global

capital.[122] "Globalized production and marketing," explains Alvin Toffler, "require capital to flow easily across national boundaries. This, in turn, demands the dismantling of old financial regulations and barriers erected by nations to protect their economies."[123] Transnational business and global capital are linked directly. "As corporations integrate their production and distribution across national boundaries, acquire foreign firms, and draw on brainpower from around the entire world, they inevitably need fresh sources of capital in many countries....[this need created] multinational securities firms that buy, sell, underwrite, and invest in many nations."[124] Transnational companies and global capital blur what had been clear   With globalized finance, a part of what had been the sole realm of a soveriegn nation is lost.

The nature of instant tele-communications and the rise of computer technology blurs national boundaries and state sovereignty. Tele-communications is one of the two main factors, according to Joseph S. Nye, that has "revolutionized global markets and accelerated the development of transnational corporations that transfer economic activity across [national] borders."[125] Electronic money zips from corporation to corporation ignoring national boundaries, following only tele-communication links via computers and modems. "Life was simple," writes Alvin Toffler, "when each country's telephone system was controlled by a single company or ministry...and international standards were...decided by the International Tele-communications Union."[126] Life became more complex when computers began talking to one another, satellites began connecting corporate computers, and the number of telephone companies grew. Individual states fully control neither the flow of information that fuels the fast-moving, global economy nor the flow of information reported by the global media system

The transformation of the nature and extent of national sovereignty is changing the international community. "Increasingly," reports Joseph S. Nye in *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power*, "the solutions to many current issues of transnational

interdependence...require collective action and cooperation among states....further, there are no purely domestic solutions to such transnational problems; rather, collective international action will be a critical part of their solution."127 International organizations, multi-national institutions, and global conventions--like the United Nations, the World Court, international agreements and sanctions--are rising in importance. They are starting to congeal into the rudiments of a *common power* that is capable of ending the Hobbesian state of nature in the international community. World opinion, aided by a increasingly global media system, is speeding the jelling process. Exemplifying the reach of television, *Megatrends 2000* presents this vignette: "Ocobamba, Peru, a tiny village of 400 people had battery-powered television before running water, regular mail service, and even electricity."128 While Toffler recognizes that "the global media system will not make nations behave like Boy Scouts," he correctly points out, it does raise "the cost of defying world opinion."129 No one can doubt the important role world opinion, the global media, and international institutions and conventions played in the Vietnam War, the downfall of Marcos, the call to eliminate Apartheid, the growth of demoncracy in Eastern Europe, the opening of the USSR, or the reforms in China. To be sure, the pressures of world opinion, international convention, or global organizations were not the sole causes of these events. Further, these pressures are felt less in closed societies than in open ones. However, these pressures have been and remain forces significant enough to be considered as major influences in the shaping of and the responses to world events. Their consideration and force will continue to grow.

Nations are significantly less sovereign than they were fifty years ago. Unilateral action in pursuit of a nation's self interest is an option less available to individual nations today than fifty years ago. For these reasons then, the Hobbesian model is diminishing in its utility. It cannot yet be discarded; however, Spanier's description of the international community as

absent of a "set of rules or norms that govern the way in which political conflicts can be resolved peacefully" is no longer as accurate as it was.[130] Even without a central government in the full sense, the international scene has developed and will continue to develop beyond one in which states are akin to Hobbes' "every man against every man." The transformation is not complete, but the direction is clear and momentum established.

The set of the international stage has changed. The theoretical foundation which American strategic planners assume and from which they begin their analysis is, itself, in question. As if this fundamental change were not enough, America's "Moriarty" has vanished

To say that the Soviet Union presents no threat to the United States is to overstate the case. However, unless one has been cloistered absolutely for the past 30 years, one cannot deny the radically different Soviet Union that the United States faces. Kennan foresaw events most clearly when he said in 1947, "If disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. Soviet power is only a crust....Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies."[131]

What remains of the Soviet threat are three items. First, her ideology. Marxist thinking is dialectical and teleological. Thus it allows for deviations and temporary setbacks *en route* to its ultimate goal of a world in which Communism is the dominant ideology. In fact, in a pure Marxist sense, a society must first pass through capitalism in order to develop into the ideal communist society. The USSR had never passed through its capitalist phase. Thus, a Marxist theorist could plausibly argue that the current changes in the Soviet Union are necessary and will ultimately result in the true communist state Marx envisioned. Second, the Soviets retain the ability to launch full and deadly nuclear strikes against the United States Thus the threat to the physical destruction of the United States remains regardless of who is

governing or how they govern. Third, the USSR still has on active duty large numbers of well-equipped conventional forces. She is not a military eunuch.

Even in light of the above, however, the Soviet threat to the United States is insignificant. First, even if what we are seeing in the Soviet Union is only the capitalist phase Marx claims is necessary, "going through" that phase seems certain to last more than a few years. Further, to go through the phase, the Soviet Union will have to become a relatively open society, change the current modes of production, alter the social relationship between the government and citizens, and adjust her *modus operandii* in the international community These actions, of which we see evidence, should satisfy even the staunchest "neo-McArthyite" that the nature of the Soviet threat has changed. Perhaps at some time in the future, the Soviets will again move toward the communist rhetoric of the Cold War. The United States should deal with this eventuality then, not now. Second, while the U.S.S.R. still does possess significant nuclear and conventional strength, she does not have the will to use either. Hundreds of thousands of draftees fail to report for duty, and internal civil war threatens the cohesion of the Soviet Union. Events in the Soviet Union have moved to such a point that even if a conservative coup seized control of the central government, one could question--for internal economic and political reasons--whether she would pose a significant threat to the United States.

Unfortunately, as the Soviet threat moved off stage, others moved on. Some nations are led by aggressive terrorists, torturers, and totalitarians, or by fanatics armed with increasingly lethal weaponry. Therefore threats to the United States, its citizens, and the values for which it stands, remain.

However, the changing nature of the domestic and international communities and the changing face of the Soviet Union now confronting the United States entail changes to the Cold War policy of containment, the national strategy of deterrence, and the organizational behavior that had succeeded under the old paradigm.

As successful as our policy of containment has been, its necessity is over. The aggressive, ideological and militarily menacing Soviet Union need not be contained any more. "For the United States," says Peter Drucker, " the disintegration of the Russian Empire means a total change in foreign policy, and in the assumptions that have undergirded American foreign policy."[132] Recognizing the same need, President Bush writes that the United States "must move beyond containment to seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system as a constructive partner....Moscow will find us a willing partner in creating the conditions that will permit the Soviet Union to join, and be welcome in, a peaceful, free, and prosperous international community."[133] Further, no other nation has stepped forward to threaten the United States, either physically or ideologically, as the Soviet Union did. Therefore, the need to contain the Soviet Union, or anyone else, is past.

Containment was the national policy from which deterrence flowed. The two, as demonstrated earlier, are linked essentially. With no justification for the policy of containment, what happens to the strategy of deterrence as currently practiced?

The *raison d'etre* of America's Cold War strategy of deterrence was to preclude Soviet expansion. With this motivation gone, what shall the United States deter? Some might suggest: deter aggression, or instability, or proliferation of non-democratic governments. However, executing any of these superficial answers would quickly overcome the economic capability of the United States. Each would require that the United States become, permanently, the world's police force. Further, adopting any as the U.S. *modus operandii* would result in more deployments of forces than either the U.S. Congress or the people would accept and more than the budget could afford. Therefore, such answers are infeasible and unrealistic. In the section entitled, "Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s," his *National Security Strategy of the United States* President Bush answers by saying, "The United States seeks, whenever possible

in concert with its allies, to deter any aggression that could threaten its security."[134] But even this answer is incomplete for two reasons.

First, for the same reasons the previous answers are unsatisfactory--that they commit the United States to too much--President Bush's use of "security" is imprecise. By using that word, the President certainly cannot mean each and every threat to our security is justification for going to war. Rather, its use must mean that the United States seeks to deter other nations from threatening the physical existence of the United States or the security of our vital national interests. That this second use is the proper understanding of the President's use of "security" seems to be the proper conclusion.

Second, given that President Bush wants to deter threats to our security as understood above, the real question is not "What shall the United States deter?" Rather, "When should the United States use military force?" To answer this question, one must distinguish "vital" national interests from other interests. I shall take up a discussion of this topic in the last section of this essay--suggestions for a new paradigm. The discussion thus far is sufficient to suggest to the following minimal conclusion: the notion of "deterrence," at least as professed in the current paradigm, is inadequate. Its inadequacey results from its essential link to containment for which no justification now exists.

This conclusion, especially when added to the shifts in the nature of the international community, the nature of the threats facing the United States, and the dissolution of containment, would be enough to demonstrate that the paradigm under which the United States national military strategy has developed and been executed for the past 40 years is shifting. However, world trends and realities are also affecting the traditional understanding of the balance of power and the need to focus on a European battlefield.

The world in which the former Soviet threat was identified, containment professed, and deterrence executed is no longer bi-polar in the same sense as in the past. "Elements of bi-

polarity will continue," reports Joseph S. Nye, "particularly at the military level...But these elements alone are unlikely to be sufficient to restore containment as the central strategic concept for the coming decade."[135] When one considers all the elements of national power, to claim that the United States and the Soviet Union are co-equal global superpowers seems unsupportable. Further, although the U.S.S.R. retains significant conventional and nuclear power, one must remember that the questions: "Does country x have y?" and "Is country x capable, all things considered, of using y?" are two separate questions--logically and practically. The Soviet Union has and is capable of using her nuclear arsenal; the likelihood of the Soviet economy supporting a major war is remote--at best. The USSR has but is incapable of using ther conventional forces in such a way so as to pose a serious, sustained threat to the United States or NATO-- at least in the near and mid-term.

With this shift, the worst-case scenario involving a Soviet attack of Western Europe dissipates. There may be other, good reasons for some kind of American presence in Europe, however, a U.S. presence in Europe cannot use as its justification the threat of imminent and potentially pre-emptive attack by the Soviet Union and its allies of the former Warsaw Pact.

Simultaneous with the shifts in containment, deterrence, the balance of power, and the Soviet Union, are the changes bureaucatic organizations are currently undergoing. In the business world, large, bureaucratic corporations are changing. They are restructuring to survive and prosper in the current domestic and international milieau. Tom Peters, in *Thriving on Chaos*, characterizes that mileau as chaotic and uncertain where successful organizations will "enhance responsiveness through increased flexibility, short-cycle innovation."[136] Successful companies will be ones which can produce within their leadership and workers a wholesale change of attitude and which will reduce layers of management, flatten their organization, break down the barriers between functions, and create systems that result

In continual interchange of data.[137] When applying innovations and methods of operation adopted from the business world for use in the military, one must be cautious of believing, falsely, in an exact correspondence between the corporate world and the military world. Such a belief is wrong, and would yield inappropriate conclusions. However, one does seem warranted in investigating why large corporations--with whom the Department of Defense bureaucracy shares many characteristics--feel the need to restructure. Perhaps, there may be some correspondence with DOD.

One gets the sense from reading *Megatrends 2000, The New realities, Powershifts,* and *Thriving On Chaos* that much more important that any one individual change occurring in the world--domestic and international--is the conflation of the number of changes and the rate of those changes. The pace of change in the world, and the uncertainty which results from this pace, place significant stress on bureaucratic organziations and their leaders.[138] Toffler outlines these difficulties when he says,

> The real trouble starts...when turbulence in...the economy, or society stirs
> up completely new kinds of problems or opportunities....Suddenly
> decision-makers confront situations for which no cubbyholed information
> exists. The more accelerated the rate of change...the more such one-of-a-kind
> situations crop up....When situations that can't be assigned to predesignated...
> cubbyholes [occur], bureaucrats get nasty....What we see...is a burgeoning crisis
> at the very heart of bureaucracy. High speed change not only overwhelms its...
> structure, it attacks the very deepest assumption on which the system is based.[139]

Toffler continues by saying, "high speed change requires equally high-speed decisions-- but power struggles make bureaucracies notoriously slow....Bureaucracy will not vanish....but the environmental conditions...are changing so rapidly...they can no longer perform the functions for which they were designed." He concludes by stating unequivocally that "It is now accepted that companies will wither under competitive fire if they cling to the old centralized bureaucratic structures that flourished during the smokestack age."[140]

The requirement for business organizations to focus, decide, and act more efficienctly

and effectively in a fast paced, uncertain, near-chaotic environment seems quite analogous to the situation in which military professionals find themselves. A number of recently published documents, authored by senior Defense Department officials, suggest the similarity of the situations. Secretary Cheney, in his *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, characterizes the present world situation as an "era of tremendous uncertainty."[141] Amplifying this view, the Secretary of the Army reports, "As we enter the 1990s, our nation faces a significantly more complex and varied security environment than at any time in our history" and a future full of uncertainty.[142] General Carl E. Vuono adds his description of the current environment in which military professionals must operate. He says, "many of the conditions that have undergirded our nation's security strategy for more than four decades are being rendered obsolete by the rush of events around the world."[143] General Vuono then explains that one of the dominant characteristics of the world in which we find ourselves today is the ongoing march of change.[144] Finally, Stephen K. Conver, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, says, "Our watchword for the future is change. The new and markedly different world political and economic scene, along with the declining defense budget, will result in dramatic changes in the way we do business."[145]

In the section of his annual report entitled, "Strengthening Defense Management," Secretary Cheney discuss ways to make the Department of Defense more efficient without losing effectiveness. The prime impetus behind his call is the awareness of a declining budget.[146] Declining monies, however, is only one of the reasons which motivates DOD to scour its bureaucracy. A second reason, one that might actually be most important, is this: the world in which DOD must operate--domestic and international--is a rapid-changing world, and an overly bureaucratic DOD organization will not be able to keep pace in that world.

Goldwater-Nichols and the changes it brought to the Department of Defense have helped.

are helping, and will continue to help DOD to restructure. Budget cuts will also force some efficiency related changes. However, "any hope of replacing bureaucracy...involves more than shifting people around [and eliminating] 'fat,' ....Today, change is so accelerated and the information needed is so complex that the channels, too,...are overwhelmed, clogged with messages."147 Further, any serious change must be not only organizational but also one of intellect; the military profession must find within itself the "intellectual muscle and creativity" to deal with "this time of epochal change."148

Innovation, flexibility, creativity, rapidity of decision making and action, divestiture of vested interest and parochial focus, and breaking from the inertia of the past--these are the requirements that the numbers of changes and pace of those changes place upon organizations and leaders. These are the traits which trends and realities require organization to engender, similarly, these are the traits which are required of the military strategists.

Interim conclusions

The merits of a...theory are in proportion to the correct predictions which it implies.

Stephen Toulmin
Foresight and Understanding

The beliefs which the American military profession has shared; agreed upon as those which should govern our military thinking; used to solve the puzzles of the past 45 years and to interpret, organize, and explain our world; and taught in our professional development schools are changing. The process began almost imperceptibly; no one could have predicted the changes that have occurred or the rapidity of those changes. Thus, one seems warranted to suggest that using the current paradigm to solve contemporary problems will result in solutions that will not work. The current paradigm no longer "fits" reality. Two choices manifest themselves.

The first: continue to hold to the old paradigm, with some modifications possibly, calling

the new observations anaomolies or exceptions. The second: search for and adopt a new paradigm. That we have this choice indentifies our position as a trainsition period

Another characteristic marking the transition period between paradigms, Kuhn explains, is the debate over the future direction of the profession.[149] Such a debate is apparent in the military profession. Professional journals, briefings, position papers, "think-tank" studies--all evidence the concern of the profession over "where its going." This debate will result, sooner or later, in a new paradigm, one which conforms to the changing world. Further, the debate is healthy, albeit uncomfortable for some. It will help the profession determine the best way to raise, equip, deploy, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain the nation's armed forces so as to be prepared for the future. Our national military strategy is not vacuum-born. It is derived from a certain set of beliefs, a paradigm, that governs those who establish the strategy--the military profession, both civilian and uniformed.

The logic and evidence presented in this on-going debate seems to lead one to the second choice--search for and adopt a new paradigm. That is, the profession ought to search for a new set of beliefs which conform to current realities and will, therefore, constitute a usable paradigm from which to derive a new national military strategy. When it comes to paradigm shifts, however, logic and evidence are necessary but insufficient in and of themselves. In a literal sense, to identify the requirement to shift paradigms is to identify a crisis in faith. The old paradigm worked. The profession has reason to believe in it. No such guarantee exists with a new one. Momentum will always be with the old paradigm; the tendency in any profession will always be to modify its current paradigm, not to change it. The risk involved in changing is significant. But, as the French saw, the risk in not changing is also real. Of what might a new paradigm consist?

Step 4: Implications: Suggestions for a new paradigm

It is impossible for a limited understanding to foresee [the] future... experienced persons... should serve us not... to arrive at certitude, which is impossible, but... to act with the utmost possible reasonableness on the facts.. given us

Leibniz
Ethics, Law, and Civilization

According to the Hobbes, only a powerful common government can guarantee peaceful coexistence. Without this common power, the natural state in the international arena is a state of constant war or potential war between soveriegn states.[150] The applicability of Hobbes' ideas is in question for two reasons: first, states are not as sovereign as they once had been; second, even in the absense of a powerful common government, world opinion, global organizations, and multi-national agreements constrain the behavior of states much more than they had. The ideas of the following theorists provides a more plausible alternative to the Hobbes' view: *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, *"Of the Origin of Government,"* and *"Of the Original Contract"* by David Hume, a 18th century Scottish historian and philospher; *The Emergence of Norms* by Edna Ullmann-Margalit, a 20th century sociologists and *The Strategy of Conflict* by Thomas Schelling, a 20th century international relations theorist. While neither Hume, Ullmann-Margalit, nor Schelling--like Hobbes before them-- specifically addresses the international community, what they say is applicable and illuminating.

This alternative, which I shall call "Humean," starts by assuming that each state recognizes that its long-term best interest lies in peaceful, cooperative arrangements among members of the international community <u>provided</u> other states do the same. The guarantee that nations will act according to this proviso, they suggest, develops naturally, over time in the following way: first, some nations--and to a significant degree other, non-national, global agents--enter into cooperative arrangements with one another. Second, these arrangements

result in regularities of behavior and of expectations among those cooperating. Other nations, seeing the advantages of these arrangements and being heartened by the regularity of behavior and expectations, join in. Third, regularities of behavior and expectations develop into conventions among participants. Conventions add even more predictabilty and stability to the behavior of states. Finally, the conventions develop into norms, the last step in the process.[151]

The Hobbesian model holds that violence and coersive power are the only guarantor of international order and, in the absence of such a common power, violence, or the threat of it, is the norm. Hume suggests that rational self-interest is the primary guarantor of an international order and that violence is the exception to the rule. Further, with Ullman-Maralit and Schelling, he demonstrates that regulated, normative behavior can and does develop even without the establishment of a "common power." Predictability, stability, and advancement of interest result initially from regularity of behavior, then from conventions and norms. This alternative reveals a deeper understanding of the nature of coercive power. Coersion is not imposed externally as Hobbes says it must be. Norms which arise from regularities of behavior and conventions--that is from the choices states and other international actors make--are sufficiently coersive to result in predictability and stability No common power, as Hobbes requires, must exist to produce an international order.

The important point is this: the international community can govern itself sufficiently enough to guarantee predictability, stability, and advancement of individual states' self interest without the existence of a world government. Rogue states will take advantage of these arrangements from time to time. Violence and the use of force will never be eliminated. However, this is the exception rather than the.rule. Further, the international community will develop--and some might use the current Iraqi crisis as evidence that such a development is occurring now--conventions and norms to govern how rogue states are to be handled.

Every state should, but certainly nations like the United States who are recognized as

leaders in the world community must, reinforce regularities of behavior, conventions, and norm that have developed and are developing. Doing so adds weight to the force these regularities, conventions, and norms have; adds legitimacy to the process; and adds momentum toward the development of more useful, more long-lasting, and more binding norms--all of which is in the long term best interest of each individual state and the community as a whole. The alternative suggested in the ideas of Hume, Ullman-Margalit, and Schelling is not utopian. It is, however, a more accurate description and explanation of the how the international community works and is more suggestive concerning what nations must do to create the kind of stable world environment require for each nation to flourish.

This accuracy results in suggesting that it be the theoretical foundation of our new paradigm which, in turn, suggests a method for reassessing the threat and replacement concepts for both containment and deterrence. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. suggests that "the critical question for the future of the United States is not whether it will start the next century as a superpower with the largest supply of resources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and to get other nations to do what it wants."[152] The kind of control over the political environment that seems in the best, long-term interest of the United States appears to be the kind which results from developing norms by which the international community will govern its behavior--as suggested by Hume, Ullman-Maragalit, and Schelling.

Just as the military profession must consider an alternative to the Hobbesian model as the theoretical foundation to its new paradigm, the profession must consider a new "threat." For the past forty-five years the primary threats to the "ultimate survival or well being of the nation" have been from external sources--specifically the Soviet Union and her surrogates. Correctly, we have placed our primary emphasis in countering these threats. Some, albeit diminished, external threats to the security of the United States remain. However, emphasis will shift to internal threats to our vital national interests, those which "threaten the ultimate

survival or well being of the nation."[153]

America remains threatened by external sources, but to a much lesser extent than she had been. The U.S. cannot turn our back to these threats; neither can she give them the same emphasis she had given the ubiquitous Soviet threat. The security of our nation--its ultimate survival and well being as the kind of nation that America is--ultimately rests upon a strong, healthy economy, an educated polity , and governmental agencies that can react quickly and effectively enough in today's fast changing, complex world. To lose sight of the requirement to secure these ultimate foundations of our national strength is to define "national security" too narrowly.

Any threat to these ultimate foundations of our national strength are surely threats to our "vital national interests," albeit non traditional because of their "internal" nature. Five such internal, non-traditional threats are: the national deficit, a sagging economy, drug abuse, a poor education system, and overly bureaucratic governmental agencies. Each strikes at the heart of our democracy. The deficit and sagging economy steal our economic future and our abilty to modernize and compete. Drug abuse erodes respect for democratic institutions and the values upon which this nation was founded. Like our growing deficit, drug abuse literally steals the future from young Americans. Our education system keeps us from developing the educated polity required to sustain a democracy and to compete in the fast-paced, high-tech, information-based marketplace. Overly bureaucratic governmental agencies, civilian and military, reduces our ability to respond quickly enough to the rapid pace of change which is characteristic of our current domestic and international world. The rate of change in social, economic, fiscal, technological, corporate, and international worlds is such that overly bureaucratic organizations cannot keep pace.[154] "Rapid change means...uncertainty [and] competition from the least-expected quarter," explains Toffler, "[and] bureaucratic organizations is too slow

and cumbersome."[155] One can see evidence of our bureaucracies being unable to act quickly or

decisively enough in a series of challenges: the savings and loan crisis, deficit reduction, the

problem of AIDS, producing a budget, countering drug abuse and narco-trafficking, housing the

homeless, and fixing America's education system. Corporations are learning the need to

restructure to such a size so as to be responsive to the pace of their marketplace. Government

agencies and departments must learn the same lesson.

This second class of threats is not the classic external, "enemy-coming-over-the-wire"

threat one is used to identifying as those challenging our vital interests and national security

To view national security in these terms is quite non-traditional. However, one cannot deny

that these threats seriously jeopardize our national security, especially in light of the analysis

contained in two recent books which explain what it takes for a nation to be, and remain, a

great power. The first in Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic

Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000;* the second, Alvin Toffler's *Powershift*

"Perhaps the best way to comprehend what lies ahead is to look *backward* briefly,"

Kennedy says, "at the rise and fall of the Great Powers over the past five centuries."[156]

Looking backward, Kennedy argues that all great powers have had to balance, simultaneously,

three competing priorities: "to provide military security (or some viable alternative to

security) for its national interests, *and* to satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry, *and*

to ensure sustained growth, this last being essential both for the positive purpose of affording

the required guns and butter at the present, and for the negative purpose of avoiding a relative

economic decline which could hurt the people's military and economic security in the

future."[157] To emphasize any one for too long, Kennedy claims, will result in decline from a

position of great power. Kennedy's analysis concludes: too much spending, over time, in the

military realm for what is normally called "national security," is equally as bad as too much

spending, over time, in the domestic realm for what is normally called "social security."

Toffler presents a different perspective on the source of a nation's power. His analysis of the source of a nation's power identifies the following three items as most important: violence (military strength), wealth (economic strength), and knowledge (educational strength).[158] Each is important, for a nation whose power is balanced among all three elements of the triad is a nation prepared for all challenges the future may bring.[159] However, knowledge is the basis for creating wealth, adapting to changing situations, the central source of advanced economies, and a force multiplier in the realm of military strength.[160] The educational strength of a nation will give it the edge it needs in the fast-paced, ever-changing, dangerous world of the 21st century. Therefore, Toffler concludes that "more important than either arms or wealth is the knowledge on which both are increasingly dependent."[161]

Armed forces correctly focus on the more traditional, external threats to national security. This focus must remain, for the world still contains powerful threats to the physical security of the United States and her citizens. While the diminishing Soviet threat does not leave a "Shangri-la" world, the military profession must realize that for legitimate purposes of national security, America's priority of effort and spending may have to go to counter the non-traditional, internal threats. Only by doing so, at least in the near term, will the country be able to sustain its national strength in the fullest sense. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *The Cycles of American History*, explains that such a shift in focus is a quite normal, perhaps even necessary, shift that has recurred throughout American history.[162]

If the military profession had only to digest two new beliefs--that of a Humean theoretical foundation and "internal" threats to national security--the conceptual flexibility required of it would be significant. Unfortunately, more is required. The beliefs concerning containment, deterrency, and balance of power, as well as changes to the profession's

organizational behavior require re-thinking and adaptation.

Already, the policy of containment is giving way to a policy of inclusion. The cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R has strengthed international regularities of behavior and conventions. The Soviets see that it is in their own self interest, as Hume observed, to enter a Humean world order. America's best interest lies in doing what it can to reinforce further development of regularities of behavior, conventions, and norms. The resulting predictability and stability is the kind of world in which America's well being can flourish. It is also the kind of world in which the well being of other nations flourishes--a fact that more are beginning to understand which, in turn, further strengthens the development of norm-guided behavior in the international arena even without the Hobbesian "common power."

The predictability and stability resulting from a Humean development of norms is unlike that resulting from coercive force or fear of it. The former is deeper, more long lasting because it is imposed internally, built upon self-interest, and results from development over time. The latter is shallow, and will not stand the test of time because it is imposed externally. Once the external, coercive power is gone, the reason to regulate one's behavior goes too. The result is a break up of whatever patterns of regularity and conventions that had been present. To a large degree, one can see exactly this kind of phenomenom in the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. To use force to establish a long-lasting, predictable and stable world is to demonstrate that either one does not understand the correct source of stability or one is interested only in the short-term.

Force still has its place, but not to establish predictability and stability. Rather, the use of force will be linked to one of two cases. Case One: a single nation or a coalition of nations will use armed force to deal with a "rogue" state that has violated, or is threatening to violate, established regularites, conventions, or norms. Case Two: a single nation, or more rarely a coalition of nations, will use, as a last resort, armed force to protect its vital national

interests. These two variants of the use of force change the nature of deterrence in new paradigm.

In one sense, the strategy remains valid. America's armed forces continue to deter use of nuclear arms, global war, and regional conflicts. In another sense, the justification for deterrence has changed absolutely. The concept was linked essentially to the ideas of an aggressive Soviet threat and the policy of containment--neither of which is now valid. In the past we could justify use of American force by showing that use would deter the Soviet Union or her surrogates, thus contain Communism. Such a justification is no longer valid.

So, when should the United States use military force? The answer is found in the two variants described above. The first variant is relatively straight forward. The second, however, because of its use of "vital national interests" requires clarification. What is a "vital national interest"? Jeffery Record, in *Beyond Military Reform*, offers this definition: "any interest in defense of which one is willing and able to go to war."[163] The initial draft of JCS PUB 0-1, *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, echoes Records' definition by saying that "vital interests are those deemed worth fighting for."[164] Such answers are useless tautologies. Robert E. Osgood, in *Limited War Revisited*, presents a more useful answer of vital interests: "those directly and imminently [linked] to physical or economic security of the United States."[165] Likewise the glossary of JCS PUB 0-1 says that "a vital interest is one which threatens the ultimate survival or well being of the nation."[166] Any interests beyond this are subordinate and may or may not justify the use of force.

In the paradigm required by the new world trends and realities, justified intervention replaces deterrence as the standard for determining when the United States should use its armed forces. Intervention is justified in at least the two cases described above--to deal with the "rogue" state, or to protect vital national interests. However, a nation does not use its force

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each and every time it may be justified in doing so, for other important considerations impact upon the decision to use force. For example: To what degree are the interests of the United States threatened? What is the imminence of the threat? What will be the cost to the United States? What will be the cost not to use U.S. military force? To be sure, the answers to these questions are difficult and largely non-quantifiable. More important, unlike deterrence which offered strategists a near blanket approval for use of force, intervention must be justified in each and every case.

This approach does not suggest American isolationism. The United States is a global superpower and, as such, retains leadership responsibility. Further, a rogue state or other agents threatening to destroy the development of international regularities of behavior, conventions, and norms may require a counterforce. However, American forces need not be involved in each of these instances. In fact, in light of America's requirement to focus on internal threats to its vital national interests--the deficit, drug abuse, the quality of education, and overly bureaucratic governmental agencies---one could present a plausible argument that American forces ought to be involved as little as possible.

The United States cannot, nor should it, divest itself of its global leadership responsibilities. However, neither can it divest itself of its domestic responsibilites. The United States has not had to balance her attention between external and internal threats to the degree now required. This is new and uncomfortable ground, especially for military professionals. What is required is not the trite "doing more with less." Rather what seems to be needed is this: a complete review of American committments, a re-identification of the conditions under which America should use her armed forces, and establishing global security arrangements, perhaps even regional, which will preclude--as in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq-- the United States from shouldering the military load.

The new theoretical foundation, the changed nature of the threat, and the replacements

for containment and deterrence require America's military profession to alter its belief in the traditional the balance of power. The U.S. is now concerned with simultaneously balancing powers in the international scene and developing the power that comes from balancing its internal sources of power.

Balancing powers refers to the return of the multi-polar international world. The power of Japan, the European Economic Community, oil producing nations, and others--all have risen since World War II's end. Even if one rejects the claim that America is in decline, one cannot reject the rise in the power of other nations and regions. The bi-polar world is now an historical phenomenon, no longer applicable to the international community. Also falling to history is America's primary focus on Europe. The countries of Europe as an economic power, the vanished threat of the great NATO-Warsaw Pact battle along the GDP trace; the development of financial and economic interdependence, transnational actors and issues, and the growing importance of world opinon, global organizations, and international conventions--all constitute the reasons why America's primary focus is global, not regional or European. Finally, balancing powers will occur in the Humean, interdependent world. Developing regularities of behavior, conventions, and norms will itself become a form of balance.

The power of balance[167] refers to power a nation derives from balancing two triads. The first, from Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, concerns the three essential of a national economy: to provide for military security, to satisfy socio-economic needs of its citizenry, and to ensure sustained growth.[168] The second, from Alvin Toffler's *Powershift*, concerns the three essential sources of national power: military, economic, and educational.[169] The power of balance will result from successful treatment of the internal threats now emerging with the United States. Thus, one seems warranted in suggesting an essential unity in the elements of the new paradigm.

Finally, the new paradigm from which America's future national military strategy is derived must contain a belief in restructuring overly bureaucratic arrangements. This restructuring is not merely consolidation of functions, although consolidation is important. Rather, the restructuring must eliminate unnecessary layers in the bureaucracy and quicken the transfer of information among those needing it.

The requirement for timely responses in fast changing situations is true of governmental agencies and departments. "Pace," Toffler explains, "is determined by the speed of transactions, the time needed to [make] decisions...the speed with which data, information and knowledge pulse through the...system."[170] Pace also is a function of the speed with which recommendations are suggested, evaluated, and implemented and the time needed to go from identify new organizational or equipment requirements to "making it happen "

To achieve this kind of restructuring within DOD, and other governmental agencies and departments as well, will require a change in philososohy. One sees the seeds of of this kind of change in the observations and recommendations concerning bureaucracies and the resultant decision-action cycles in the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management when the commission discusses the DOD acquisition organization and procedures and defense strategy development.[171] "No one expects bureaucratic organizations to disappear," explains Toffler, "[they] remain appropriate for some purposes."[172] What the new paradigm requires, however, is to recognize that: "today's changes...come at a faster pace than bureaucracies can handle....The faster things change in the outside world...the greater the stress placed on bureaucracy's underlying framework and the more friction and infighting."[173]

This kind of restructuring and the need to meet the needs of an uncertain, fast changing future, will require the military profession to foster and reward creativity and innovation Only with these traits will the profession be able to undertake the difficult task of defining the

beliefs which should make up the new paradigm, then deriving from that paradigm the new ways in which the nation will raise, equip, deploy, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain its armed forces.

Summary and epilogue

In this essay, I argued that fundamental changes in national military strategy involve shifts in the way the military profession views the world--first comes a conceptual shift, then, practical changes. I chose Kuhn's paradigm model because he demonstrates that the beliefs which make up a profession's paradigm provide the foundation of that profession's culture and governs the daily problem solving activities within that profession. He also demonstrates why paradigm shifts are hard for professions to acheive. The essay's argument developed in four steps: first, an explanation of the nature of a paradigm, how it works, how and why it shifts. For this explanation I used the paradigm governing the inter-war French military profession as an example. Second, a description the U.S. military's current paradigm; third, trends and realities which challenge the current paradigm's legitimacy; and fourth, suggestions concerning a new paradigm. The evidence presented in the essay, summarized at appendix one, argues that America can no longer raise, equip, deploy, organize, educate, train, fight, coordinate, and sustain the nation's armed forces guided by the current paradigm. Too much has changed. America requires a new paradigm from which to derive her national military strategy. The suggestions I have adduced as possible components of a new paradigm are surely not the final answer; however, the nation requires some similar guide.

Shifting paradigms is traumatic and dangerous. The danger is even more real, and thereby one is warranted in being more cautious, when one is concerned with the security of the nation. Danger correctly elicits caution and prudence; it should also elicit courage. As the eminent psychologist Rollo May points out, "the need for creative courage is in direct proportion to the degree of change the profession is undergoing....[When called upon] to do

something new, to confront a no man's land, to push into a forest where there are no well-worn paths and from which no one has returned to guide us...to leap into the unknown...requires a degree of courage for which there is no immediate precedent and which few people realize."174

Appendix 1. Summary of findings in steps two through four.

CURRENT PARADIGM	NEW TRENDS and REALITIES	NEW PARADIGM
Hobbesian nation-state System	decreasing soveriengty; increased import of global organizations, conventions, and opinion	Humean International System
the Soviet Threat	Soviet nuclear and conventional strength remains; will to and likelihood of use gone; collapse of Soviet economy	Diminished external threats; increased non-traditional, internal threats
Containment	nothing to contain	Inclusion
Deterrence	no justification for Cold War understanding of deterrence	Justified Intervention, linked to vital national interests and international order
Bi-polar Balance of Power	Bi-polarity gone	Balancing Powers and Power of Balance
European Focus	justification for focus on Europe gone	Global Focus
Cumbersome Bureaucracy; Nostalgic point of reference	pace of change threatens bureaucacy's ability to cope; more intellectual flexibility and creativity required of leaders	Faster, More Creative analysis

END NOTES

1. Robert Allan Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939* (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, Inc., 1985). pp. 116-177.

2. JOINT PUB 1-02, *Department or Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 1 December 1989, defines **"military strategy"** is defined as "the art and science of employing the armd forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." (p. 230) As a definition of "natinal military strategy," this definition is incomplete in that it addresses only the employment of armed forces. It leaves out all together how the nation raises, equips, and organizes its armed forces which (a) are important components of a military strategy at the national level, and (b) directly affects how the armed forces are employed. The definition is deficient further, unless one holds that the concept of "employment" contains within it the ideas of educate, train, coordinate, and sustain "

The JOINT PUB's definition of **"national strategy"** does not help, for this term is defined as follows: "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (p. 244) Only within the definition of "strategy" does one find the hint that the nation's national military strategy consists of something more than employing its armed forces. **"Strategy"** is defined as "the art and science of <u>developing and using</u> political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace, and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." (emphasis added, p. 350)

From the terms "developing and using," one sees that the concept of "strategy," when applied to the armed forces includes the raising, equipping, deploying, organizing, educating, training, fighting, coordinating, and sustain of the force in question.

3. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). pp. 160-70, 176, 210

4. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 52-110.

5. Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Irme Laktos and Alan Musgrave (ed.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980). pp. 61-65.

6. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, p. 65.

7. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 160-70, 176, 210.

8. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 5, 23, 46-7, 92, 193.

9. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 10, 29, 59-60.

10. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 10, 27, 76

11. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 59-60.

12. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 38.

13. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 85, 112, 120-1.

14. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 4, 11, 136-43.

15. Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britian, and Germany Between the World Wars*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984). pp. 125-27.

16. Doughty, pp. 98-107, 152.

17. A "methodical battle" could be defensive or offensive. By the term *bataille conduite*, or "methodical battle," the French "meant a rigidly controlled operation in which all units and weapons were carefully marshalled and then employed in combat. The French favored a step-by -step battle, with units obediently moving between phase lines and adhering to strictly scheduled timetables....A hastily prepared, impulsive fight was doomed to failure. The focus of decision-making was best kept at higher command levels, because centralized control was necessary to coordinate the actions of numerous subordinate units." (Doughty, pp. 3-4; see also pp. 101-2 for a detailed example of the phases of a methodical attack.)

18. Doughty, pp. 91-111.

19. Posen, pp. 105-6, 111-115, 118-21.

20. Doughty, pp. 91-111, 136-37, 146-47.

21. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, p. 23.

22. Doughty, p. 3.

23. Posen, p. 108; Doughty, pp. 18, 21.

24. Doughty, pp. 136-160.

25. Doughty, p. 146.

26. Some might point to the "Dyle Plan" as evidence that the French were not solely defensive in orientation. Such an observation is only partially correct. The Dyle Plan did call for movement of large forces forward from French soil to locations generally along the Dyle River in Belgium. One must remember, however, that there, the Frech were to take up the defense. The purpose of the move was to reach a defensive position outside of France at which to fight a defensive battle. In making this move, it is true that the French risked fighting "encounter battles," just the kind of battle they wanted least to fight. But, the French--not without some debate--concluded that the risk was worth the move. In executing this plan, the French again demonstrated their overall defensive mind set. What some might call an offensive operation was, in reality, a movement to defensive positions.

27. Posen, pp. 112, 128.

28. Posen, pp. 107-9.

29. Doughty, p. 176.

30. Posen, p. 177.

31. Doughty, p. 177.

32. Doughty, p. 147.

33. Doughty, pp. 32-3, 93, 103.

34. Doughty, pp. 152-3, 160.

35. Posen, pp. 85-6.

36. Doughty, pp. 32-3.

37. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, p. 74.

38. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 77-8.

39. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 65-74, 82-6.

40. as quoted in Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, p. 83.

41. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 84-5.

42. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 84-93.

43. For a more complete understanding of other problems related to changing an Army see the following: Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, March 1974, pp. 3-11; Stephen Peter Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," *International Security*, Summder 1988, pp. 134-68; Genral Donn A. Starry, "To Change and Army," *Military Review*, March 1983, pp. 20-7; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, "Challenge for the Future: Educating Field Grade Battle Leaders and Staff Officers," *Military Review*, June 1984, pp. 2-13; Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, "How to Change an Army," *Military Review*, November 1984, pp. 33-49

44. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 111-35, 144-59, 169.

45. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 157-8.

46. Determining how large organizations change is a complex problem, one with no single answer. Kuhn, for example, claims that revolution is thought that result in fundamental changes to professions are usually provoked by "men so young or so new to the crisis-ridden field that practice has committed them less deeply than most of their contemporaries to the world view and rules determined by the old paradigm." (Kuhn, p. 144) Posen seems to present an analogous view when he says that "military organizations will seldom innovate autonomously, particularly in matters of doctrine ...those at the top of the heirarchy, who have achieved their rank and position by mastering the old doctrine, have no interest in encouraging their own

obsolescence by bringing a new doctrine. Thus, innovation should occur mainly when the organization registers a large failure, or when civilians with legitimate authority intervene to promote innovation." (Posen, p. 224) From Kuhn and Posen, one concludes that fundamental change rarely results from the long-standing, heirarchy-controlling members of a profession. Rather, fundamental change comes from what colloquially might be terms "young turks" or "outsiders." Stephen Rosen, in *New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation*, presents the opposite view.

Rosen argues that military innovation is a long-term process over which civilian government officials have, at best, limited and indirect influence. Further, he claims that successful innovation must come from within the senior officer corps and proceed through the advancement of young officers into higher ranks. Indeed, according to Rosen, only recognized, established members of the profession have the know-how to identify which alternatives have the highest probability of success on the battlefield and to "sell" the innovations to the profession via argument and demonstration. (Rosen, pp. 16-25, 33-50)

47. Doughty, p. 128.

48. Doughty, p. 134.

49. Doughty, p. 138.

50. Doughty, pp. 145-7, 150, 153.

51. Doughty, p. 140.

52. Doughty, pp. 140-1.

53. Doughty, pp. 152, 157-9.

54. Posen, p. 133.

55. Doughty, p. 164.

56. Doughty, p. 183.

57. Doughty, p. 77.

58. Doughty, pp. 72-90.

59. Doughty, p. 83.

60. Doughty, p. 88.

61. Doughty, p. 89.

62. Doughty, pp. 112-13.

63. Doughty, p. 115.

64. Doughty, p. 128.

65. Doughty, 150.

66. Doughty, p. 136.

67. Doughty, pp. 137-177.

68. Doughty, p. 190.

69. Doughty, pp. 182, 184.

70. Doughty, p. 166.

71. Posen, p. 132.

72. Doughty, p. 167.

73. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Herbert W. Schneider, (Indianapolis, Indiana Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1958). pp. 104-5

74. Hobbes, pp. 106-7.

75. Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). pp. 35, 27-50.

76. Beitz, pp. 35-70.

77. John Spanier, *Games Nations Play*, 5th ed., (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975). p. 11.

78. Spanier, p. 72.

79. Beitz, pp. 27-50.

80. For a more contemporary use of the Hobbesian model, see John J. Mearxheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic*, August, 1990, pp. 35-50. Mearsheimer says, "For untamed anarchy is what Europe knew in the forty-five years of this century before the Cold War, and untamed anarchy--Hobbes's war of all against all--is a prime cause of armed conflict." He goes on to analyze the demise of the bi-polar world as a return to a state system whose character, multi-polar and unstable, "drives states toward war." This character he explains, using several scenarios, is quite Hobbesian based.

81. Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990). pp. 1, 5; President George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Wahsington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990). pp. 15, 23-50.
Secretary Chaney's report is the annual DOD report listing national security concerns and defense priorities. It consists of an analysis of the status of defense resources and components, a recapitulation of the budget, as well as the statutory reports from each of the service secretaries.

President Bush's report is broader in scope. Its purpose is to set the strategic direction for the nation by presenting the President's view of the world. the 1990 report contains what the President considers the foundations of national strategy, America's goals and interests, trends developing in the world and the challenges those trends present to the United States, and how the President envisions allocating means to the goals and interests he states.

82. For a broader understanding of the post WW II controversy converning the Soviet threat and the proper U.S. response, see the following articles: George Kennan (as "X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1947, pp. 566-582;John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security*, Spring 1980, pp 164-176; the editors of *Foreign Policy*, "Interview with George F. Kennan: 'X' Plus 25," *Foreign Poolicy*, Summder 1972, pp. 5-21; Charles Gati, "What Containment Meant," *Forsign Policy*, Summer 1972, pp. 22-40; Chalmers M. Roberts, "How Containment Worked," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1972, pp. 41-53; George Kennan, "Reflections: Two Views of the Soviet Problem," *The New Yorker*, November 2, 1981, pp. 54-62.

83. Samuel F. Wells Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security*, Fall 1979, p. 131; "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," NSC 68, (Washington.D.C., April 14, 1950). pp. 4, 7-12.

84. Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and All That," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1990, p. 94.

85. Wells, pp. 133, 136.

86. NSC 68, p. 4.

87. Wells, p. 149.

88. Secretary of Defense James R. Schelsinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY75*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oifice, 1974), pp. 45-8, 81.

89. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, FY85*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 21-26.

90. Cheney, p. ix.

91. Lieutenant General Charles B. Eichelberger, "The Hazards of an Unstable World," *Army*, October, 1990, p. 152.

92. George Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 354-367.

93. Kennan, 1947, p. 575.

94. Tucker, p. 108.

95. Kennan, 1947, pp. 576, 581.

96. Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., *American National Security: Policy and*

Process, (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 61.

97. Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 65-78; Roberts, 47.

98. Bush, p. v.

99. Kennan, 1947, p. 581.

100. NSC 68, pp. 60-5.

101. Kissinger, p. 61.

102. Watkins, 8-10; Kelley, 22-5--Maritime Strategy

103. Bush, p. 23; Chaney, p. 29.

104. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power,* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1990), pp. 69.

105. DOD Annual Report FY75, p. vii.

106. Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War,* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982), pp. 96-98; Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953,* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), pp. 65-6, 74-5.

107. Peter F. Drucker, *The New Realities,* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), p. 38

108. Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game,* (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 161-215, Gary Hart and William S. Lind, *America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform,* (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler, 1986), pp. 211-25; Edward N. Luttwak, *the Pentagon and the Art of War,* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), pp. 32-92.

109. Smith, pp. 194, 161-215.

110. Mark Perry, *Four Stars,* (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pp. xiii-35, 341-4.

111. For a full view of the workings of the JCS and bureaucracy of the Pentagon see: Carl H. Builder, *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process,* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1987) pp. 2-90; Sammuel P. Huntington, "The Competition of Strategic Programs," *The Common Defense,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) pp 369-425; Armold Kanter, "The National Security Policy Process, Military Subordinates as Policy Allies, Conclusions" *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective,* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1975) pp. 3-13; 95-117; 118-122; William R. Kintner, "The Limits and Problems of Reform," *Forging a New Sword,* (New York. Harpr & Brothers, Publishers, 1958) pp. 171-183; Lawrence J. Korb, "Conclusion," *The Joint Chiefs of Staff,* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976) pp. 173-188, Asa A. Clark IV, "Interservice Rivalry and Military Reform;" David C. Jones, "What's Wrong with the Defense Establishment?" Paul Gorman, "Toward A Stronger Defense Establishment," and Philip A Odeen,

"JCS Reform: A Commentary" in *The Defense Reform Debate*, (Baltimore, Maryland: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) Peter W. Chiarelli et.al. (eds.); Gary Hart and William S. Lind, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and The Congress," *America Can Win*, (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler,1986) pp. 211-260; Jeffrey S. McKitrick, "The JCS: Evolutionary or Revolutionary Reform?" *Parameters*, Spring, 1986, pp. 63-75.

112. McKitrick, p. 63.

113. McKitrick, p. 72.

114. A. J. Bacevich, "New Rules: Modern War and Military Professionalism," *Parameters*, December, 1990, pp. 12-23. If one doubts that the American military professional is locked in the kind of nostalgic embrace to which Colonel Bacevich refers, one should review the fourth revision to the Navy's Maritime Strategy (Feb 89) and the Army's AirLand Battle Future document (Jan 90).

   The Navy presents a strategy whose primary purpose is demonstrating how fleet operations can be integrated into a global conventional war. While careful to say that the strategy is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict, the document, by its own admission, is "gauged against the requirements of this [global war against the Soviet Union] unlikely, but possible, occurrence." (p. 10)

   The Army's document is similarly focussed. Again, like the Navy's Maritime strategy, AirLand Battle Future is careful to discuss the changing world environment, reduced US-USSR tension, the need for a global rather than European focus, and the requirement to operate across the specturm of combat. In this regard, the doctrine reflects the fact that it was written a year after the Navy's Maritime Strategy. However, the document then goes on to list deterring Soviet aggression as the "focus of our 21st century national security objective." (p. 7) Further, it returns the Army to the technology based, firepower oriented operational strategy for which it was famous during World War II. (see sepecially pp. 4-6, 24, and 35)

   To be fair, both documents make an attempt to break from the traditional mold. Both try to account for international events changing as rapidly as any in history. Both are welcome in that regard. But, neither go far enough. One gets the sense that both documents will be used to justify what each service already has--and more.

115. Nye, p. 245.

116. Drucker, p. 116.

117. Drucker, pp. 124-5.

118. Drucker, p. 164.

119. Alvin Toffler, *Powershift*, (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), p. 121.

120. Toffler, p. 227.

121. Toffler, pp. 460-1.

122. Drucker, p. 127.

123. Toffler, p. 57.

124. Toffler, p. 426.

125. Nye, p. 183.

126. Toffler, p. 136.

127. Nye, pp. 187, 239.

128. John Naisbitt & Patricia Aburdene, *Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990s*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990), p. 187.

129. Toffler, p. 345.

130. Spanier, p. 72.

131. Kennan, 1947, pp. 579-80.

132. Drucker, p. 37.

133. Bush, p. 9.

134. Bush, p. 2.

135. Nye, p. 235.

136. Tom Peters, *Thriving On Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), pp. 3-4.

137. Peters, p. 118.

138. Peters, pp. 3-45; Toffler, pp. 80-1, 168-73, 234, 260-64, 397-412; Drucker, pp 259-61.

139. Toffler, pp. 168-9, 173.

140. Toffler, p. 166.

141. Chaney, pp. ix, 1.

142. Secretary of the Army Michael P.W. Stone "First Echelon of Strategic Deterrence in a Turbulent World of Diverse Threats," *Army*, October, 1990, pp. 11-12.

143. General Carl E. Vuono, "The U.S. Army in the 1990s," *Army*, October, 1990, p. 16

144. Vuono, p. 19.

145. Stephen K Conver, "RDA Budget Reflects Requirements, Reductions and Political

Realities," *Army,* October, 1990, p. 67.

146. Chaney, pp. 14-7.

147. Toffler, pp. 171-2.

148. Bacevich, p. 23. Colonel Bacevich goes on to list five challenges which "confront the Army as it enters a new era: (1) to grasp the extent to which global developments have rendered obsolete many of our customary routines and assumptions; (2) to be wary of our own selves--our penchant for nostalgia, our yearning to retain a distinct, elevated status in society--as obstacles to seeing war and its requirements objectively; (3) to recognize that war long ago outgrew the boundaries of traditional military craft and to expand our conception of professionalism accordingly; (4) to factor into any consideration of future wars the involvement of civilian populations--ours, the enemy's, and those of non-belligerents who nonetheless are more than mere observers--as central to the definition of war aims, strategy, and the methods that soldiers will employ in accomplishing their mission; and (5) to postulate a new theory of warfare deriving not simply from the limits of technological possibility but from the political and moral dictates of our age--dictates that can redefine themselves with disconcerting suddenness." (p. 22)

149. Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions,* pp. 84-93.

150. Hobbes, pp. 109-112.

151. David Hume, "Of Justice and Injustice," and "Of the Original Contract," *Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy,* Henry D. Aiken (ed.), (New York: Hafner Press, 1948), pp. 49-66, 356-372; David Hume *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* (Chicago, Illinois: Paquin Printers, 1963), pp. 15-38; Edna Ullmann-Margalit, "Coordination Norms," *The Emergence of Norms,* (Oxford; at the Clarendon Press, 1977), pp-. 74-133; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict,* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp 53-80.

152. Nye, p. 175.

153. JCS PUB 0-1, G1-11

154. Peters, pp. 3-35; Toffler, pp. 25-9, 77, 152, 168-9, 214-40, 397-9, 459.

155. Toffler, pp. 125, 299.

156. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000,* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp 438-9.

157. Kennedy, p. 446.

158. Toffler, pp. 12-21, 25-91.

159. Toffler, pp. 430-51; Drucker, pp. 180-86, 232-48.

160. Toffler, pp. 15-6, 91.

161. Toffler, p. 433.

162. Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., "The Cycles of American Politics," *The Cycles of American History,* (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), pp. 23-48. On page 44, Schlessinger presents the following table to illustrate the cyclical rhythm in American foriegn policy:

Introvert	Extrovert
1776-1798	1798-1824
1824-1844	1844-1871
1871-1891	1891-1918
1918-1940	1940-

163. Jeffrey Record, *Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas,* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 165-6.

164. JCS PUB 0-1, p. G1-11.

165. Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War Revisited,* (Bolder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p 102.

166. JCS PUB 0-1, p. G1-11.

167. Toffler, p. 423.

168. Kennedy, p. 446.

169. Toffler, pp. 12-21, 35-92, 423-466.

170. Toffler, p. 397.

171. Quest for Excellence, Blue Ribbon Report, xx-xxvii, 16-20, 43-71.

172. Toffler, p. 199.

173. Toffler, p. 168.

174. Rollo May, *The Courage to Create,* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 2, 13.

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